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Let me begin by saying that I really enjoyed reading this well written and very 
interesting paper. What Nancy does in this paper is to present a cohesive survey of three 
strands of literature: the theoretical literature on currency crises, banking crises, and the 
more recent papers that have attempted to link the two. It is the "twin crisis" literature, 
which focuses on banking crises in open economy models, that the paper devotes the 
most attention to. Like the literature on currency crises, very different interpretations of 
the causes of the twin crises have been offered and this paper lays out some of the key 
differences between first generation models, which stress the role of economic 
fundamentals, and second generation models, which highlight the role of self-fulfilling 
crises and multiplicity of equilibria. 
I am going to divide my remarks into three parts. First, I am going to make some 
brief comments about the theoretical models discussed in the paper, complementing 
Nancy's discussion of these. Second, I am going to turn my attention to the empirical 
evidence on the links of currency and banking crises. Lastly, I will make some remarks 
about the scope and direction of future research in these areas. 
 
 2
Banking crises models with open economy features 
A predictable open-economy bank-run model, which is discussed at some length 
in this paper, is that by Dooley (1997). In the Dooley setting, the policy inconsistency 
arises because the government provides an insurance guarantee for the currency-deposit 
conversion rate yet allows the backing to support new guarantees to decline over time. 
This moral hazard story of financial crises has some appeal in explaining capital flows to 
emerging markets in the wake of the Mexican peso crisis of 1994 and the (then) 
unprecedented size of that bailout. It also may help explain why domestic-foreign interest 
rate spreads fail to systematically rise ahead of crises (see Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996). 
However, I do have two issues as regards this story that I would like to add to Nancy's 
comments on this paper. The first issue has to do with the role of uncertainty. In this 
framework, moral hazard arises because the guarantee offered by central bank reserves is 
fully credible. But, of course, in reality there may be both uncertainty and information 
asymmetries. Surely, as was the case in Thailand, derivative positions (the central bank 
had borrowed dollars in the forward market) can hide what the "true" level of reserves is. 
Hence, an investor may not have full information on the extent to which the liabilities 
being issued are fully backed or not. In a similar vein, as the recent Asian crises have 
shown, the extent of liabilities or implicit guarantees that are outstanding is often not 
known until after the crisis. In either case, an investor would face the risk, with a nonzero 
probability, that the central bank does not actually have enough reserves (either its own 
or those it can borrow from international organizations) to bailout everyone. In this case, 
uncertainty about who gets paid and who doesn't would mitigate investors' appetite for 
these bank deposits. 
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Second, it is important to remember that these grandiose bailouts are a relatively 
new feature of international capital markets while booms and busts in the capital flow 
cycle and financial crises have been around for a long time. It must be remembered that 
foreign investors, harking back to the previous century and Latin American railroad 
bonds, have lost a lot of money during financial crises. Hence, one can only take the 
moral hazard argument to explain the ebb and flow of cross border capital movements so 
far. Turning to second generation explanations of the twin crises, as Nancy notes, there 
have been two recent papers that have extended the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
framework to an open economy setting-Goldfajn and Valdes (1996) and Chang and 
Velasco (1998). The brief remarks that I will make here apply to both of these models. As 
in the original paper, the crises in these models are owing to a liquidity problem on the 
part of banks. The banks may be faced with runs and may not be able to borrow from 
abroad to satisfy deposit withdrawals. The key assumption in the models that gives rise to 
illiquidity is that banks borrow short (from abroad) and lend long (to domestic projects). 
It is worth noting, however, that this illiquidity scenario presumably rules out the 
existence of foreign banks, which would have recourse to liquidity in times of 
unexpectedly large withdrawals via the parent bank abroad. Secondly, it also rules out 
banks holding any liquid asset, such as an internationally traded bond, that can be 
liquidated if the need arises. The introduction of either of these plausible considerations 
into the models would considerably dampen their explosive behavior. 
 
Empirical evidence on the links between banking and currency crises 
Given that the theme of this paper has been the parallels and links between currency and 
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banking crises, I feel I should discuss briefly what the empirical evidence tells us about 
the chronology of these events (Table 1). This part of my discussion is based on 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), which examined the issue in some detail. 
 
From the analysis of nearly thirty banking crises, it would appear necessary to 
start the discussion of these crises talking a little bit about financial liberalization. Most 
of the banking crises we examined in that paper shared the common feature that the 
financial sector had been liberalized shortly before the crisis took place. It would appear 
that the removal of interest rate ceilings and reductions in reserve requirements that are 
part of the liberalization process in an environment of lax regulation and even more lax 
supervision is a recipe for an indiscriminate lending boom and an eventual banking crisis. 
In turn, as the bad bank loans pile up and the financial sector begins to depend on central 
bank credit and low interest rates, the seeds are sown for a policy inconsistency between 
the central bank's exchange rate commitment and its endeavors to act as a lender of last 
resort to the banks. 
More often than not, this policy incompatibility ends up as a currency crisis. 
However, the story does not end with the currency crisis, as the devaluation itself appears 
to have pernicious feedback effects on the banking sector. There are clearly balance sheet 
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effects, among other transmission channels, that merit close scrutiny. Indeed, most often 
the peak of the banking crisis (if not its beginning) occurs shortly after the currency 
crisis. Nor does the story end there. As the economy contracts, often severely, the 
domestic financial sector remains mired in serious difficulty for an extended period of 
time. In that analysis, we also show that when currency crises occur alongside banking 
crises the crises are far more severe than when the currency crisis occurs without banking 
sector problems (see Table 2 and Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998a). Also, the recessions 
are deeper and more protracted and the crash in asset prices far greater. Indonesia's 
decline in GDP of nearly 14 percent in 1998 starkly reminds us of the severity of these 
capital-market crises. 
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While the models that Nancy has reviewed in the paper capture several features of 
banking and currency crises, these models as well as a much broader family of first and 
second generation models of currency crises, are silent on several crucial dimensions. 
Hence, high on the list of topics for future research in the area of financial crises, I would 
stress three broad themes, that have received comparatively little scrutiny. 
First, we should develop models that can explain the self reinforcing vicious circle of 
banking crises and currency woes. Specifically, the oft-observed pattern of banking crises 
leading to currency crises and the latter making the financial sector problems even worse. 
Pinning down the balance sheets of firms and banks and modeling the balance-sheet 
effects of these crises would clearly be a welcome addition to this literature. 
Second, more research needs to be done on what Calvo (1998) has called the 
sudden stop problem, referring to the sudden stop or drastic reversal of capital inflows 
and its highly disruptive effects on economic activity. We need to gain a better 
understanding of the determinants of the output collapses we observe. This would be a 
departure from existing models. In both first generation and second generation models 
devaluations are expansionary. In an example of a first generation model, Gerlach and 
Smets (1995) explain "contagion" following a devaluation in one of two countries that 
are engaged in bilateral trade with one another by the recessionary effects in the second 
country of the real appreciation after its trading partner devalued. In that linear model the 
devaluation in the second country occurs because the decline in output leads to a decline 
in money demand and a loss of international reserves. In Obstfeld (1994), for instance, 
the policymaker's loss function weighs the loss of credibility from devaluing from the 
economic loss of not doing so. In either case devaluations produce the textbook 
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improvement in economic activity. Clearly, the aftermath of devaluations in emerging 
markets paint a very different picture, which we have yet fully to understand and 
formalize via a model. In this regard, understanding the behavior of banks following the 
crises is of some importance as, for a variety of reasons, bank lending dwindles and 
banks often hold high levels of excess reserves. 
Lastly, the role of foreign banks in propagating disturbances-or, more broadly, the 
role of common lenders-as a vehicle of contagion is another area where models have been 
relatively scarce. Yet, some of the recent evidence on the channels of contagion, such as 
Frankel and Schmukler (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998b), point to the 
importance of a variety of financial sector links. 
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